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a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of the dispute. Therefore,
the court held that the case was not moot.
The court next addressed NPPD's election of remedies argument.
The election of remedies doctrine aims to prevent a plaintiff from
receiving double recovery by asserting several claims or seeking
inconsistent remedies. However, the court noted that the junior
appropriators were not seeking inconsistent remedies or double
recovery but merely enforcing separate rights by invoking their senior
preference right and challenging the validity of NPPD's appropriation
status. Nothing in the condemnations proceedings precludes a junior
appropriator who is invoking its senior preference right from also
challenging the validity of the senior appropriation right. Were it
otherwise, the court reasoned, junior appropriators would have to
relinquish their constitutional preference rights to challenge the validity
of a senior appropriation right. The court reasoned NPPD's election of
remedies argument called for a result inconsistent with the Nebraska
Constitution and was without merit.
Because the junior appropriators still had a legally cognizable
interest in the administrative hearing and were not seeking double
recovery but enforcing separate rights, the court remanded the case to
the Department for further proceedings.
Michael Eden
OREGON
Gienger v. Dep't of State Lands, 214 P.3d 75 (Or. App. 2009) (holding
that a creek is a "water of the state" and that unpermitted removal of
material from the bed and banks of the creek is a violation of section
196.810 of the Oregon Revised Statutes).
Lenhart Gienger ("Gienger"), a dairy farmer, owns land through
which Golf Course., Creek ("creek") runs. In January 2004, Gienger
removed fifty cubic yards of material from the bed and banks of the
creek. The Department of Fish and Wildlife ("department") investigated
the excavation site and observed several hundred cubic yards of
material removed from the banks of the creek. The department issued
Gienger a cease and desist order, and, in a proposed order, fined him for
unpermitted removal of material from the creek. In a contested case
hearing, the administrative law judge ("ALI") issued a proposed order
finding that, although the creek was a "water of the state" under section
196.810 of the Oregon Revised Statutes, the creek was exempt from the
permit requirement pursuant to section 196.905(3), (4), and (6). The
department disagreed, issued a final order in which it added an
additional finding of fact, and concluded that no exemption from the
permit requirement applied. Gienger sought judicial review of the final
order before the Court of Appeals of Oregon ("court").
Gienger raised five assignments of error to the department's final
order. First, he contended that the department's additional factual
finding (that although the creek has been channelized and relocated
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over the past 150 years, it has retained its character as a natural
waterway beginning in the foothills and flowing into the Wilson River)
improperly contradicts the ALI's findings. The court concluded,
however, that a preponderance of the evidence supported the factual
finding. In response to Gienger's contention that the department
improperly rejected and modified the ALI's factual findings in
concluding the creek was not a drainage ditch, the court stated that the
question of whether the creek was a drainage ditch under
administrative rules and section 196.905(6) is a legal issue as opposed
to a factual issue. Thus, any modification on that issue was not a
modification of ALI's findings of historical fact. The court clarified that
its function is to review the agency's conclusions for errors of law.
In his second and third assignments of error, Gienger argued that
the department's final order contradicted section 196.905(6) (which
exempts structures such as drainage ditches from permit requirements)
as well as the department's handbook on regulations relating to
drainage ditches. Pursuant to the plain meaning of the statute and the
definition of "structure" in the administrative rule, however, the court
affirmed that the channelized stream is a natural waterway and not a
drainage ditch. In order to be a drainage ditch under the section
196.905(6) exemption, the creek must result from manual excavation
with a design to remove water, instead of resulting from natural causes.
The court found the department's application of the administrative rules
plausible and consistent with the wording of the rules and section
196.905(6).
Lastly, in his fourth and fifth assignments of error, Gienger asserted
that the department wrongly concluded that neither of the exemptions
in sections 196.905(3) or (4) applied to his removal of material from the
creek. The court, nevertheless, agreed with the department that these
Although Gienger's property is a
exemptions are inapplicable.
"converted wetland" under section 196.905(3) and a "prior converted
cropland" under section 196.905(4), the court determined that the
exemptions did not apply to removing material from the banks of a
stream itself.
Accordingly, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the department's
final order.
Todd Likman
WASHINGTON
Grundy v. Brack Family Trust, 213 P.3d 619 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009)
(holding that (1) the "common enemy" doctrine exempting property
owners from liability for property damage due to surface water
diversions does not apply to seawater; and (2) damage from seawater
trespass is a cause of action for a civil tort of intentional or negligent
trespass).
This case involves next-door neighbors Calvin and Joyce Brack
("Brack") and Evelyn Grundy ("Grundy"), shoreline property owners

